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ABSTRACT: One of the major outcomes of the present ailing social and economic conditions 
in sub-Saharan Africa is the enormous waste of resources due to project delay and cost 
escalation in the region. This paper critically analyses the causes and effects of project delay 
and cost escalation in sub-Saharan Africa taking Nigeria as a case study. The major causes of 
project delay and cost escalation in Nigeria from experimental survey were acknowledged and 
ranked. The ranking was carried out using the relative net difference between the mean severity 
index percentage and the standard error of mean percentage in order to achieve unambiguously 
the ranking for each variable factor. Empirical analysis revealed the consequences of project 
delays and cost escalation for some completed projects in Nigeria with these subsequent 
findings: the minimum average percentage escalation cost of projects in Nigeria was 14%; the 
minimum average percentage escalation period of projects in Nigeria was found to be 188% 
with an average percentage completion work of just 96%. To enhance the ability to study this 
disturbing trend in the future, some mathematical relationships to forecast future project delays 
and cost escalation effects in Nigeria was developed. It was recommended that efficient man-
power and material systems, alternative financial strategies and increased contingency 
allowance pattern in pre-contract estimates be developed.  
 
Keywords: Infrastructure-delays, Causes, Effects, Cost-Escalation, Nigeria, sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper addresses the problems resulting from infrastructure delays and cost escalation in 
Nigeria through a detailed empirical analysis of its causes and effects. Secondary data was 
collected from the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Works and Housing and questionnaire survey 
results from Mansfield et al. (1994). This literature and data addresses the causes of delays 
and cost overruns in Nigerian construction projects. Firstly, however, it would be appropriate 
to develop an overview of infrastructure projects in sub-Saharan Africa, and Nigeria in 
particular. 
Developing countries invest about US$200 billion a year on new infrastructure, and 
this constitutes 4% of their national output and a fifth of their total investment (World Bank 
1994). The result has been a striking increase in infrastructure services for transport, power, 
water, sanitation, telecommunications and irrigation. However, one billion people in the 
developing world still lack access to clean water and nearly two billion lack sufficient 
sanitation (World Bank 1994).  Meanwhile, in rural areas, women and children frequently 
spend long hours fetching water just to meet daily needs. At the same time, transport systems 
are deteriorating rapidly, while electric power is yet to reach two billion people in many 
developing countries, all of which has implications for employment and education (World 
Bank 1994). This demand for infrastructure to modernize production and enhance both 
domestic and international competitiveness is overwhelming and exceeds existing capacity. 
Despite these inadequacies, population growth and urbanization are exacting more pressure 
on the few available infrastructures in these countries (World Bank, 1994). 
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In bridging the huge infrastructure gaps, there is an urgent need for a thorough 
appraisal of the process of infrastructure delivery in the developing countries. One of most 
pressing concerns is the alarming rate of project delay and cost escalations in the construction 
industry for most developing countries. Such trends have adversely affected infrastructure 
provision in sub-Saharan African countries with specific reference to Nigeria.  
The relevance of the construction industry to the task of bridging this huge 
infrastructural gap is obvious because the social and economic stability and relevance to the 
world economy of any developing country hinges to a considerable extent on the 
effectiveness of that industry (Ofori et al. 1996). The relatively large investments committed 
to construction, makes the industry an important source of demand generation (Ofori et al. 
1996). The multiplier effect of this demand (i.e. the great capacity to generate employment, 
income and expenditure in other sectors of the economy) contributes distinctively to the 
general economy (Mansfield et al. 1994; Ofori et al. 1996).  
However, various projects of high economic and social relevance in Nigeria, worth 
billions of naira, are in complete state of disrepair. Amongst them are abandoned hospitals, 
clinics, markets, dams, airports, office blocks, housing projects, school buildings, factories, 
industries, libraries, theatre complexes, hotels, hi tech installation-to mention just a few. 
Nonetheless, the pivotal role of the Nigerian construction industry in the mainstream 
economy gives weight to the need for effective planning and management of this sub sector. 
Construction investment accounts for over 60% of the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 
(i.e. the total national investments in Nigeria) and only 20% of the GFCF in most other sub-
Saharan countries (Dlakwa and Culpin 1990). By implication, the construction industry in 
Nigeria has a far reaching effect in comparison to other countries as it could impede national 
growth and planned economic developments if it becomes ineffective, as observed by Dlakwa 
and Culpin (1990). The enormous debt burden of over US$31 billion as at 2005 ending makes 
this problem of project delay and cost escalation in practically all infrastructural projects 
much worse. Worse still, the limited and scarce resources divested as a result of these 
problems further compounds the poverty level of the nation.  
 
 
3. OBSERVATION 
 
Mansfield et al. (1994) survey results (the secondary data employed for this investigation) 
have been summarised in Tables 1, 2 and 3. In addition to Mansfield et al.’s investigation, the 
authors are of the view that price fluctuations, inaccurate estimates, delays and additional 
work are not necessarily cost overrun variables only as indicated in Table 2 but also of delays. 
Hence, it is wise to classify all the variable factors as factors responsible for project delays 
and cost overruns in Nigeria.  
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Table 1.  Questionnaire distribution and response 
Description Number 
distributed 
Number of 
respondents 
% of number 
distributed 
% of number of 
responses 
Contractors 
Consultants 
Public clients 
Total 
35 
25 
20 
80 
15 
13 
09 
37 
43 
52 
45 
41 
35 
24 
47 
Source: [Data from Mansfield et al. (1994)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Factors responsible for project delays and cost overruns from Mansfield et al. 
(1994) 
 
Severity index, % Variables 
Contractors Consultants Public clients 
Poor contract  management 
Financing and payment of completed works 
Changes in site conditions 
Shortages of materials 
Imported materials and plant items 
Design changes 
Subcontractors and nominated suppliers 
 
Cost  overrun variables (only): 
Price fluctuations 
Inaccurate estimates 
Delays 
Additional work 
80 
100 
74 
74 
54 
66 
80 
 
 
100 
86 
73 
60 
100 
92 
84 
76 
84 
68 
62 
 
 
100 
76 
91 
77 
100 
88 
77 
77 
88 
66 
55 
 
 
100 
66 
88 
77 
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Table 3.  Summary of survey results from Mansfield et al. (1994) 
Severity Index % Variable 
code 
Variables 
contractors consultants Public clients 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Financing and payment of completed works 
Poor contract management 
Subcontractors and nominated suppliers 
Shortages of materials 
Changes in site conditions 
Weather 
Design  changes 
Mistakes and Discrepancies in contract document 
Imported materials and plant items 
Preparation and approval of drawings 
Nonadherance to contract conditions 
Mistakes during construction 
Negotiations and obtaining of contracts 
Labour and management relations 
Inspection and testing of completed portion of work 
Construction methods 
Price fluctuations 
Inaccurate estimate 
Delays 
Additional  work 
Fraudulent practices and kickbacks 
Shortening of contract periods 
Insurance 
100 
80 
80 
74 
74 
67 
66 
60 
54 
54 
47 
40 
33 
27 
13 
13 
100 
86 
73 
60 
54 
40 
13 
92 
100 
62 
76 
84 
62 
68 
46 
84 
46 
62 
53 
38 
31 
15 
23 
100 
76 
91 
77 
60 
60 
15 
88 
100 
55 
77 
77 
55 
66 
55 
88 
55 
66 
22 
44 
55 
33 
11 
100 
66 
88 
77 
44 
55 
22 
 
 
4. METHODOLOGY OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS CARRIED OUT  
 
Firstly, the authors had sought to determine if there was an acceptable general agreement 
amongst respondents in terms of the relative severity index accorded all the variable factors in 
Table 3. The one-way analysis of variance (One-way ANOVA) test was applied to the data in 
Table 3. One–way ANOVA was employed because of its robustness – i.e. its property of 
broad applicability to procedures that depart somewhat from basic assumptions, a state of 
affairs common in relatively large samples of twenty or more observations (Kleinbaum et al., 
1988). This test was carried out using ORIGINS software. Furthermore, a graph was plotted 
for the severity index against the overall ranking of variables based on the severity index 
magnitudes for contractors, consultants and public clients. This was intended to facilitate a 
visualisation of the level of agreement amongst respondents (See Figure 1). 
Secondly, the data in Table 3 were subjected to a further descriptive statistical analysis 
to obtain the standard deviation of severity index, standard error of mean and the mean 
severity index (See Table 4). Using the mean severity index magnitude some notable variable 
factors were selected and ranked accordingly. At the same time, a ranking comparison of 
variable factors was carried out between the mean severity index on one hand and the net 
difference of the mean severity index and the standard error of mean on the other (See Tables 
5 and 6). 
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The methods of regression analysis and descriptive analysis were adopted for 
analyzing the effects of project delay and cost escalation using some completed highway 
projects in Nigeria from 1988-1991. The data was collected from the Federal Ministry of 
Works and Housing (See Table 7 and Table 8). The regression and descriptive analysis was 
achieved by summarising the data collected into a more presentable format that would reflect 
the effects of project delay and cost escalation (see Table 9) in terms of percentage cost 
escalation of Project (EC), percentage project cost escalation period (EP) and percentage 
completion of project work (CP). The average mean percentage, standard deviation and 
standard error of mean of  EC, EP and CP were estimated (See Table 10). The standardized 
mean of these three major effects were also estimated (see Table 11).   
Furthermore, the following regression plots of the data in Table 9 were carried out in 
order to quantitatively capture some models that would assist future forecast of the effects of 
project delay and cost escalation in Nigeria: 
• percentage (%) escalation cost (EC ) against percentage (%) escalation period (EP ) 
• percentage (%) escalation cost(EC ) against Project duration (Pd ) 
• percentage (%) escalation period (EP ) against sub total expenditure (Se) 
• percentage (%) completion of project work to date (CP) against percentage(%) 
escalation period (EP ) 
In all, testing for the best-fitted regression plot to get the best fitted model for the data 
was carried out through the means of empirical parameters like standard deviation of fit, 
correlation coefficient, and the probability that the correlation coefficient would be zero. The 
test was limited to polynomial regression plot of first, second and third degree because these 
types of polynomial are much easier approximations that could better represent the given data. 
 
 
5. DISCUSSION OF SURVEY RESULTS 
 
The results obtained from one-way analysis of variance test revealed that the means of the 
three groups of respondents are not significantly different. In addition, the plot in Figure 1 
reveals a similar order of progression in the mean severity index accorded variable factors by 
the contractors, consultants and public clients.  Hence, there was a significant degree of 
agreement amongst respondents with respect to how they ranked the variable factors. The 
following 15 variable factors were selected out of the total 23 to be the major causes of 
project delay and cost escalation in Nigeria.  
The survey results revealed price fluctuations as the most severe cause of project cost 
escalation in Nigeria. This is true because the mean severity index response from contractors, 
consultants and public clients was 100% and the mean standard error of Severity Index was 
0%; (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). This could be attributed to the limitation in 
exchange rate which in turn affects construction materials prices and the general price level. 
Another factor is the unstable inflationary trend in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa in general. 
This inflationary trend is a result of demand exceeding supply, creating a scarcity of goods 
which in turn leads to the escalation of the cost of goods. Given such a scenario, construction 
cost projection is extremely difficult (Arditi et al., 1985). 
Financing and payment of completed works was second in the order of ranking of 
factors responsible for project delay and cost escalation in Nigeria. The mean severity index 
from respondents was 97.33%. The variation in ranking between respondents amounted to a 
standard mean error severity index of 2.67%. The net difference between these two values 
was 94.66%, a difference value which indicated the marginal nature of disagreement amongst 
respondents with respect to the ranking of this factor (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 2 and 3). 
The irregular financing of public projects is a major cause of liquidity problem for 
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contractors; however, contractors can be paid in accordance with the contract agreement if 
clients can guarantee the availability of adequate funds before the project commences 
(Mansfield et al., 1994; Ogunlana et al., 1996). Regular financing and payment of completed 
works could remove constraints that could otherwise impedes project objectives, as observed 
by Oglesby et al. (1989) and reported by Frimpong et al. (2003). 
Third in ranking of factors from the survey on project delay and cost escalation is poor 
contract management. The results showed that this factor had a mean severity index of 
89.3% with a standard mean error of the severity index of 5.8% due to the level of 
disagreement amongst respondents (see Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). The difference 
between these two values was 83.5%. Poor contract management could well be attributed to 
the manner in which contracts are awarded. In most cases projects are awarded to the lowest 
bidder (Mansfield et al., 1994). Some of these low bidders may lack management skills and 
have less regard for contract plans, cost control, overall site management and resource 
allocation. As we know in the case of Nigeria, contracts are usually awarded to politicians and 
well connected individuals irrespective of the apparent deficiencies in their relevant delivery 
potentials. Accordingly, Frimpong et al. (2003) and Ogunlana et al. (1996) have observed that 
most contractors in sub-Saharan Africa are entrepreneurs who are in the business of making 
money at the expense of good management. Consequently, they pay low wages, submit very 
low bids and have very little, if any ability to plan and co-ordinate contracts (Ogunlana et al., 
1996). 
Delay constitutes another factor that was ranked fourth with a mean severity index of 
84% and standard mean error of 5.5% by respondents (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 
3). The variation in agreement of ranking by respondents was slightly less than that of poor 
contract management. The net difference in both values for delay was 78.5%. Delay in 
construction sites could be due to the absence of adequate statistics on available materials, 
fluctuations in the availability of construction materials, very long average waiting times and 
uncertainties about deliveries of ordered materials, shortages of funds to procure materials 
and inadequacy in terms of transportation (Mansfield et al., 1994). 
Changes in site conditions is another factor ranking fifth from the survey with a mean 
severity index of 78.3%; standard mean error due to variation in ranking by respondents was 
2.96% (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). The difference in values was 75.34%, an 
indication that the variations in ranking by respondents have not affected the position 
accorded this factor. This problem of changes in site conditions is attributed to inadequate 
feasibility studies before project authorisation (Mansfield et al., 1994). Moreover, political 
insensitivity and the exploitation of resident communities contribute immensely to changes in 
site conditions in Nigeria with an enormous potential to stall project developments. A 
practical example of this in Nigeria is the effects resulting from protests and repression of 
affected communities or regions plagued by neglect and environmental disasters, as in the 
Niger delta region. Such neglect and environmental disaster ranges from drinking water 
containing levels of petroleum hydrocarbons that are 350 times that allowed in European 
Union and an average of four oil spills per week to an estimated 1.1 billion cubic feet of 
natural gas flaring each day between 1976 and 1991 causing acid rain that destroys crops and 
causes illness in residents (Dixon, 2000).  
Inaccurate estimates ranked sixth. The severity index was 76% with a standard mean 
error of about 5.77% (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). The net difference in values 
between the mean severity index and the standard mean error of severity index was 70.23%. 
The ranking position accorded this factor by virtue of its mean severity index percentage is 
questionable, as shown in the next paragraph. Nonetheless, this factor could be attributed to 
the unpredictable inflationary trend, specialisation, lack of adequate training and experience at 
the senior management level, and fraudulent practices (Mansfield et al., 1994). 
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Shortage of materials was ranked seventh. The mean severity index for it was 75% 
with a very small variation to the degree of disagreement by the respondents; standard mean 
error was 0.88% (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). The net difference between both 
values was 74.12% which was greater than the 70.23% calculated for inaccurate estimate in 
the preceding paragraph. The implication of this finding is that shortages of materials ranked 
seventh because of its mean severity index magnitude ought to have been ranked sixth and 
inaccurate estimate ranked seventh. However, the reason that could be attributed for shortage 
of materials is defective supply of materials occasioned by general shortages in the industry, 
poor communications amid sites and head office, purchasing planning and materials co 
ordination (Ogunlana et al., 1996). 
Though imported materials and plant items was ranked eighth from the response 
made by the respondents in the survey, with a mean severity index of 75.3%, it accounted for 
the highest degree of disagreement amongst respondents. The standard mean error was 
10.72% (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). The net difference between mean severity 
index and the standard mean error was 64.58%.  One of the chief reasons for this drawback is 
the low level of manufacturing and exploitation of abundant local construction materials in 
Nigeria. Eyo-Ita-Eyo (2001) observed that Nigeria still imports cement when Nigeria’s 
cement production potentials surpass any other African country except Egypt and that the 100 
per cent raw materials required for cement production is readily available in Nigeria. 
Although energy contributes as much as 70% of the cost of cement production, Nigeria’s 
energy needs for this sector are adequately catered for by its enormous energy resource. In 
another development, Makoju (2000) observed that 90% of the aggregate components for 
production and delivery of electricity in the country still depends on other developed 
countries. In other words, the inadequacies of indigenous technical capabilities have 
contributed to the overdependence on foreign construction firms. 
The next in the order of ranking from the survey was the problem arising from 
additional work. The mean severity index was 71.33% with a standard mean error of 5.66% 
resulting from the variations in levels of ranking amongst respondents (See Tables 3 and 4 
and Figures 2 and 3). The net difference between mean severity index and the standard mean 
error was 65.67% which was slightly greater than the 64.58% for imported materials and 
plant items. This implied that its actual ranking position should have come first before that of 
imported materials and plant items.  Mansfield et al. (1994) had observed that additional 
work is related to design changes, which is due to lack of detailed briefing on the functional 
and technical requirements of the project by the clients. 
Design change was ranked tenth, with a mean severity index of 66.67% and a 
standard mean error of about 0.67 % (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). The net 
difference between the two values was 66%, which was higher than the two presiding variable 
factors and should have been ranked eighth instead of tenth position. This problem arose from 
inadequate project planning and management of the design process. A quite distinctive 
example is the Progress of West African gas pipeline (WAGP). Asamoah (2002) reported that 
WAGP Project has suffered a number of setbacks, culminating in the escalation of its cost 
from an initial US$430 million to US$500 million. One of the problems includes the changing 
of the initial plans to lay the pipeline offshore to an onshore configuration (Asamoah, 2002 ). 
Subcontractors and nominated supplier were ranked eleventh, with a mean severity 
index of 65.7% and a standard mean error indicating the variation in agreement of 7.45% (See 
Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 2 and 3). The difference or net value was 58.25%. The major 
reasons responsible for this factor as observed by Manavazhi and Adhikari (2002) were 
monopoly control of the market by some suppliers, work stoppages in factories, lack of 
industrialized materials, fluctuating demands forcing suppliers to wait for accumulation of 
orders and difficulty in importing raw materials from other countries. Other factors included 
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governmental delays resulting in procurement delays. During procurement, delays come from 
foreign exchange unavailability which would have been required for importing materials and 
equipment. 
The twelfth factor the Weather with a mean severity index of 61.33% and standard 
mean error of about 6.03% (See Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 2 and 3). The net difference value 
was 55.3%.  Weather was the most uncontrollable factor amongst the other variables 
considered. Temperature and humidity affects productivity of workers. If the temperature and 
humidity are high, workers feel lethargic and lose physical coordination, as reported by 
Frimpong et al. (2003). 
Non-adherence to contract conditions, mistakes and discrepancies in contract 
document all amount to fraudulent practices in Nigeria. Fraudulent practices and kickbacks 
were ranked with a mean severity index of about 52.67% and a standard mean error of 4.67% 
(See Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 2 and 3). The net difference value was only 48%. It is rather 
unfortunate that as prevalent as this factor in the sub Saharan Africa, it was ranked low by the 
respondents amongst the major factors responsible for project cost escalation. Fraudulent 
practices and kickbacks occasioned by greed are perpetuated by some major players in the 
Nigerian construction industry (Hussain, 1999). The severity index percentage of this factor in 
the survey was small because the perpetrators of this act in the industry are predominantly 
found within the rank and file of contractors, consultants and public clients as evident from 
the report published by TELL (2002). Regrettably, it was the judgement of these three 
stakeholders only that was used in defining the severity index percentages. Tell (2002) 
reported that there were verifiable cases of corruption in the execution of some of the 
contracts awarded by Petroleum (special) trust fund (PTF). The Interim management 
committee (IMC) set up by President Obasanjo found that of the total 181.8 billion naira that 
accrued to PTF for the three years it operated, as much as 25.6 billion naira was wrongly paid 
to contractors. These include inflated contracts, fraudulent overpayment of contractors by 
some of the agency officials and undue receipt of interest on funds placed in banks by the 
agency.  
In all, the presentation of the causes of project delay and cost escalation in Nigeria 
revealed five fundamental shifts in ranking positions of notable factors when ranked by the 
net difference between the mean severity index and the standard error of mean as compared to 
the mean severity index alone (see Tables 5 and 6). 
 
Figure 1. A plot showing severity index against overall ranking 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of survey results: 
Severity Index % Ranking Descriptive statistics Variable 
code Contractors Consultants Public 
clients 
Contractors Consultants Public 
clients 
mean Standard 
deviation 
Standard 
Error of 
mean 
Overall 
ranking 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
100 
80 
80 
74 
74 
67 
66 
60 
54 
54 
47 
40 
33 
27 
13 
13 
100 
86 
73 
60 
54 
40 
13 
92 
100 
62 
76 
84 
62 
68 
46 
84 
46 
62 
53 
38 
31 
15 
23 
100 
76 
91 
77 
60 
60 
15 
88 
100 
55 
77 
77 
55 
66 
55 
88 
55 
66 
22 
44 
55 
33 
11 
100 
66 
88 
77 
44 
55 
22 
1.5 
4.5 
4.5 
6.5 
6.5 
9 
10 
11.5 
13.3 
13.3 
15 
16.5 
18 
19 
20.3 
20.3 
1.5 
3 
8 
11.5 
13.3 
16.5 
20.3 
 
3 
1.5 
11.3 
8.5 
5.5 
11.3 
10 
16.5 
5.5 
16.5 
11.3 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21.5 
1.5 
8.5 
4 
7 
13.5 
13.5 
21.5 
1.5 
3.3 
9.2 
5.3 
5.3 
9.2 
7.3 
9.2 
3.3 
9.2 
7.2 
14.5 
11.5 
9.2 
13 
15 
1.5 
7.3 
3.3 
5.3 
11.5 
9.2 
14.5 
97.3 
89.3 
65.7 
75.7 
78.3 
61.3 
66.7 
53.7 
75.3 
51.7 
58.3 
38.3 
38.3 
37.7 
23 
13 
100 
76 
84 
71.3 
52.7 
51.7 
16.7 
4.6 
10.1 
12.9 
1.5 
5.1 
6.0 
1.2 
7.1 
18.6 
4.9 
10.0 
15.6 
5.5 
15.1 
10 
2 
0.0 
10 
9.6 
9.8 
8.1 
10.4 
4.7 
2.66 
5.81 
7.44 
0.88 
2.96 
3.48 
0.67 
4.10 
10.73 
2.85 
5.78 
8.99 
3.18 
8.74 
5.77 
1.15 
0.00 
5.77 
5.57 
5.67 
4.67 
6.01 
2.73 
2 
3 
11 
7 
5 
12 
10 
14 
8 
17 
13 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
1 
6 
4 
9 
15 
16 
22 
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Figure.2 Order of ranking of Variable factors and Mean severity index bar chart plot
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Figure.3 Order of ranking of Variable factors and standard mean error bar chart plot (respondents degree of disagreement)
 
Table 5. Variable factors ranking and codes using their Mean severity index magnitudes 
 
Ranking positions Variable factors Variable codes 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Price fluctuations 
Financing and payment of completed works 
Poor contract management 
Delays 
Changes in site conditions 
Inaccurate estimates 
Shortages of materials 
Imported materials and plant items 
Additional work 
Design changes 
Subcontractors and nominated  suppliers 
Weather 
Non adherence to contract conditions 
Mistakes and discrepancies in contract document 
Fraudulent practices and kick backs 
17 
1 
2 
19 
5 
18 
4 
9 
20 
7 
3 
6 
11 
8 
21 
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Table 6. Actual Ranking of the major variable factors from estimated Net difference between 
Mean, Severity Index and Standard error of mean. 
 
Actual ranking Variable Factors Variable code 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Price fluctuations 
Financing and payment of completed works 
Poor contract management 
Delays 
Changes in site conditions 
Shortages of materials 
Inaccurate estimates 
Design changes 
Additional work 
Imported materials and plant items 
Subcontractors and nominated sub suppliers 
Weather 
Fraudulent practices and kick backs 
 
17 
1 
2 
19 
5 
4 
18 
7 
20 
9 
3 
6 
21 
 
 
6. HIGHWAY DATA ANALYSIS AND REGRESSION PLOT 
 
Having analysed the actual causes of project cost escalation in Nigeria, the next stage in this 
investigation is to analyze its possible effects. Data in Tables 7 and 8 of some completed 
highway projects in Nigeria from the Federal Ministry of Works as mentioned previously in the 
methodology is presented in summary in Table 9. From Table 9 above, the descriptive statistics 
of the effects of project cost escalation is summarised in Table 10. 
To increase the probability of the calculated mean because of the variations in items of 
the given data in Table 9 to a standardised mean value or sample mean that could effectively 
approximate the given set of data, the following equation was applied. 
Practical (sample) mean = Mean + Z (SEM)………………………………….. (4) 
where: the standardized critical value Z = 1.645, SEM is the standard error of mean and the 
results obtained are shown in Table.11: 
            All the relevant plots stated in the methodology were initially plotted linearly. In 
checking for the curve that could give a suitable model that best represents the set of data, two 
basic conditions were employed, namely: 
• Comparing the parameters of each linear plot to their corresponding second and third 
degree polynomial parameters. 
• Check if the plot meets practical trend or expectation. 
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            Having satisfied the two basic conditions above, the following relationships were 
developed: 
 
EC = 4.866 + 0.027 EP .................................................................( 8 ) 
EC = 30.7 – 3.65Pd + 0.11Pd2…………………………………...( 9 ) 
EP =157.420 – 5.15x10-4 Se ........................................................( 10 ) 
CP = 2.56 + 1.38EP – 6.58 x 10-3 EP2 + 9.86X 10-6 EP3………...( 11) 
 
Table 7. The Highway Project status report showing financial progress 
Contract code Estimated 
contract sum 
(N X 103) 
Value of  permanent
work to date 
(N X 103) 
Variation of cost of 
Materials and freight
(N X 103) 
Subtotal 
expenditure to date
(N X 103) 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
12050 
17632 
16336 
8843 
54660 
69070 
52555 
11067 
6357 
9386 
10098 
13835 
7952 
49097 
48691 
47217 
7700 
4406 
1633. 0 
- 
268. 0 
119. 0 
3338.6 
9191. 4 
1841. 0 
531. 4 
130. 0 
 
9550 
11628 
14067 
8015 
54509 
62888 
48809 
8193 
4874 
Source: [Data from Mansfield et al. (1994)] 
 
Table 8.  Highway Project status report showing durations, expenditures and work progress at 
time of reporting 
Contract code Duration
months 
Completion of 
Project work to date
% 
Lapse of contract 
Period and freight
% 
Expenditure to date 
% 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
12 
23 
12 
24 
27 
30 
15 
28 
7 
76. 87 
65. 08 
80. 56 
97. 36 
100. 00 
100. 00 
94. 00 
93. 79 
99. 00 
141. 67 
97. 83 
91. 67 
126. 92 
106. 20 
175. 00 
120. 00 
100. 00 
342. 90 
79. 25 
65. 92 
86. 11 
90. 64 
100. 26 
91. 05 
92. 87 
74. 03 
76. 68 
Source: [Data from Mansfield et al. (1994)] 
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Table 9: A brief summary of Highway Project status report 
Contract 
code 
Estimated 
contract 
sum         
( Nx103 ) 
Cost of  
permanent 
work to 
date         
( Nx103 ) 
Subtotal of  
expenditures 
to date        
( Nx103 ) 
% 
Escalation 
cost to 
date 
%  
Escalation 
period to 
date 
% 
completion 
of Project 
work to 
date 
Duration 
of contract 
(months) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
12050 
17632 
16336 
8843 
54660 
69070 
52555 
11067 
6357 
9386 
10098 
13835 
7952 
49097 
48691 
47217 
7700 
4406 
9550 
11628 
14067 
8015 
54509 
62888 
48809 
8193 
4874 
1.75 
15.15 
1.68 
0.79 
11.02 
29.15 
03.37 
06.4 
10.62 
141.67 
 
97.83 
91.67 
126.92 
106.2 
175 
120 
100 
342.9 
 
76.84 
65.08 
80.56 
97.36 
100.00 
100.00 
94.00 
93.79 
99.00 
12 
23 
12 
24 
27 
30 
15 
28 
7 
 
Table. 10. Descriptive Statistics of the Effects of Project cost escalation 
Descriptive statistics Effects of Project cost escalation 
Mean (%) Standard deviation (SD) Standard error of mean (SEM) 
% Escalation cost (EC ) 
% Escalation period (EP) 
% completion of project work (CP) 
8.88 
144.69 
89.54 
9.10 
78.76 
12.6 
3.03 
26.25 
4.15 
 
Table. 11. Standardized or Sample mean values 
Effects of Project cost escalation Standardized mean (%) 
% Escalation cost (EC ) 
% Escalation period (EP) 
% completion of project work (CP) 
14 
188 
96 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Contrary to the Mansfield et al investigation, the ranking of any factor in a survey of this 
magnitude can only be explicit if done on the basis of the net value between the mean severity 
index and the standard error of mean, instead of either of these in isolation. The ranking carried 
out with the net difference in this study revealed shifts in ranking positions of notable causes 
responsible for project delay and cost escalation (see Table 5 and 6).  
The ranking accorded to fraudulent practices and kickbacks, in spite of its notable prevalence in 
the construction industry in Nigeria, was questionable. It was argued from available evidence 
that fraudulence is predominant within the rank and file of contractors, consultants and the public 
clients in the construction industry. Most regrettably, it was only these classes of respondents 
that were used in the investigation to define the extent of severity of each of these factors. In 
quantifying further the significance of fraudulent practices and kickbacks using the severity 
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index accorded it by respondents amongst the other variable factors responsible for project cost 
escalations i.e. its percentage of the selected 17 variable factors: 
{[Mean severity index for variable factor 21] x [total Mean severity index of the 17 
selected causes]-1}100%  
It was alarming from the above expression that fraudulent practices and kickbacks amounted in 
effect to just 4.36% of the total selected causes. If we decide to eliminate fraudulent practices 
and kickbacks and check what effect it has on percentage project escalation cost EC and 
percentage project escalation period EP ,  4.36% value was of no significant impact. This 
discovery is no doubt completely at variance with the obvious in the Nigeria construction 
industry which calls in question the relative ranking accorded fraudulent practices and kickbacks 
by respondents.   
Nevertheless, this study has definitively established the minimum percentage escalation 
cost of projects in Nigeria at about 14%. The approximate minimum mean percentage escalation 
period of project in Nigeria from this study was 188%. In spite of these severe loses, the mean 
average percentage completion of work was just 96%. This damaging trend has prompted the 
development of enabling equations for future forecast of these effects in Nigeria.  
Moreover, procurement guidelines should be effectively followed as it will definitely 
improve standards in many ways while excluding unqualified competitors from the bidding 
process. This process would encourage the active involvement of qualified contractors and 
suppliers in the bidding process. It would also limit the recurring incidence of fraud. 
As a means of improving the present project financing strategy, private sector 
participation is to be encouraged in financing public projects as a way of checking insufficient 
funding. This strategy would enhance greater involvement and commitment to project delivery. 
Contract methods in public private partnership (PPP) such as build-own-operate-transfer 
(BOOT) schemes could be introduced to encourage contactors to participate in financing new 
projects (Hallmans, 1999) 
The minimum 14% escalation cost of projects in Nigeria established from this study had 
reinforced the call for a more reasonable percentage increase in contingency allowance from the 
current 5-10% in Nigeria to about 15-20%, as recommended by the United States Department of 
Energy (DOE) for budget estimates (Abinu and Jagboro, 2002). There is the need to remove all 
forms of bureaucracy militating against project development in order to create an enabling 
environment for potential investors (Abinu and Jagboro, 2002; Frimpong et al., 2003; Oglesby et 
al., 1989). Stakeholders in the construction industry should as a matter of urgency establish an 
efficient and sustainable material management or expansion of local resource base and 
manpower development systems. 
For future investigation, the number of respondents should be increased to enhance a 
wider aggregate representation of views. 
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